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fore, reasonably might expect Leo to take
further care for his own safety by again
iooking toward the approaching truck during the crossint' and concludes that "it
cannot be said, as a matter of law, that
. Dunham was negligent in failing to anticipate until the truck was some 60 to 80 feet
from Leo thaI Leo was not going to yield
the right of way." The fact remains that
it cannot be said as a matter of law that
defendant was not negligent. Plaintiff's
failure to watch for approaching vehicles
goes to the issue of contributory negligence.
In order for the doctrine to apply to defendant's conduct, there must have been no
negligence, as a matter of law, on his part
until he was confronted yvith the sudden
emergency. Under the facts presented
here, it cannot be said, as "a 'matter of law,
that defendant was exercising the care of
the ordinarily prudent man in assuming
that plaintiff' would turn and see his vehicle approaching. And, the, fact does remain that defendant was at all times aware
that plaintiff was walking across the roadway without looking in his direction. As a
result, there was no basis in thc evidence of
the ,instrllctieJ:1. The giving of ail instruction whieh is u'nsupportcd by the evidence
has been held to constitute reversible errer,
Scandalis v. Jenny, 132 Ca1.App. 307, 22
P.2d 545; Davenport v. Stratton, 24 Cal.
2d 232, 149 P.2d 4. The instruction on
sudden emergency, under the facts of this
case, was inconsistent with the instruction
en negligence as it applied to the defendant. It is impossible to ascertain here
whether the jury found that plaintiff was
contributorily negligent, or that defendant
was free from negligence, or that defendant was excused from the consquences of
his negligence because he was confronted
with a sudden emergency. Instructions
contradictory in essential elements may warrant a reversal on thc ground that it cannot be ascertained which instruction was
followed by the jury, Carlson v. Shewalter,
110 Ca1.App.2d 655, 243 P.2d 549; Rackson v. Benioff, 111 Cal.App.2d 124, 244 P.
2d 9; Cannis v. Di Salvo Trucking Co.,
111 Cal.App.2d 893, 245 P.2d 365. Without the instruction on sudden emergency
/fa different verdict would not have been

5

improbable." Delzell v. Day, 36 Cal.Zd
349, 351, 223 P.2d 625, 626.
I am in full accord with the views expressed in the learned and able opinion
of the District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, prepared by
Mr. Presiding Justice Shinn when this case
was before that court, 248 P.2d 935, 937. By
unanimous decision of. that court a reversal
was ordered because Hthe instruction [sudden emergency] should not have been given
and we have no w.ay of knowing that the
jtlrors were not misled, or that the verdict
would have been the same if the inst:ruction
had not been given. See Wright v. Sni'ffin, supra, 80 Ca1.App.2d 358, 365, 181 P.2d

675."

.

I would, therefore, reverse the judgment.
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v.
PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO. et al.
S. F. 18792.

Supreme COUl't of California.

In Bank,
Dec. 18, 1053.

Action by cempensation carrier for employer whose employee sustained an industrial injury aUcgecily caused by negligence of two third party defendants,
wherein complaint contained four causes
of action, including those for compensation benefits paid to employee and for general tort damages suffered by employee.
The Superior Court, San Francisco County,
Theresa Meikle, J., dismissed cause of action for employee's general tort damages
against one of third party defendants.
Compensation insurance carrier appealed,
The Supreme Court, Spence, J., held that
one year statute of limitations as to personal injury action wa's applicable to statutory action by insul:anee carrier against
third party tort-feasor for employee's general tort damages and not three year stat-
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ute of limitations as to liabilities 'created by
statute.
Judgment affirmed.
Carter, Shenk, and Traynor, JJ., dissented.
Prior opinion, 251 P.2d 762.

caused by the negligence of third party
defendants. In its fourth cause o-f action
plaintiff sought to rec<?v~r the employeels
general tort' damages. The action was
brought -more than one year but less than
three years after' occurrence of the accident which caused the injury. A ,demurrer
t. Limitation of Actions ¢:;:)31
to this. fourth cause of action was sustained
One year statute of limitations as to without leave to amend, and from the judgpersonal injury actions was applicable to ment of dismissal accordingly ente.red,
statutory action hy insurance carrier against plaintiff appeals.
third-party tort-feasor for injuries to em[1] The determinative question is
ployee of insured and· not general three
whether
the fourth cause of action is govyear statute, of limitations as, to liabilities
the one-year statute of limitations
erned
by
created by statute. Code Civ.Proc. §§ 338,
subd. I, § 340, suM. 3; Labor Code, §§ applicable to an action for damages "for
injury to * * * one caused by the
3850, 3852.
wrongful act or neglect of another", 'Code
2. Appeal and Error <$=>79(1)
Civ.Proc. sec. 340, subd. 3, or the threeNonappearance of one alleged third- year statute applicable to an action Hup,on
party defendant in action against two third- a liability created by statute", Code Civ.
,party defendants did not preclude judgment Proc. sec. 338, subd. 1. The Labor Code
with respect to the appearing third-party authorizes the employer or its insurance
defendant from being a final appealable carrier to 'bring an action against the third
judgment. Code Civ.Proc. § 963.
party tort-feasor, sees. 3850, 3852, and to
include
therein the general damages to the
3. Workmen's Compensation ~2242
employee as well as the special damages to
Where causes of action for compenthe employer for compensation and medical
sation benefits paid to employee who albenefits, sec. 3854. Assuming without delegedly sustained an industrial 1l1Jury
ciding, that this liability of the tort-feasor
caused by negligence of two third-party
to the employer or its insurance carrier for
defendants and causes of action for emthe employee's general damages is one creployee's general tort damages were brought
ated by statute, d. Limited Mutual Compo
by employer's compensation insurance carIns. Co. v. Billings, 74 Cal.App.2d 881, 884rier against each of two third-party defend885, 169 P.2d 673, nevertheless under setants and a demurrer to cause of action for
tled legal principles the trial court correctly
employee's general tort damages brought
concluded that the one-year statute applied.
against one third-party defendant was susThe employee's general damage claim,
tained, resulting judgment of dismissal was
whether
prosecuted by the employee pera final judgment and was therefore appealsonally
or
by his employer or its insurance
able. Code Civ.Proe. §§ 338, suM. I, 579,
carrier on his behalf, is solely one in tort
963; Labor Code § 3854.
for personal injuries arising out of the
negligence of the third party tort-feasor;
Belli, Ashe & Pinney and Van H. Pin- hence the cause of action accrues at the
time of the negligent act. No matter who
ney, San Francisco, for appellant.
may be the party plaintiff, the cause of acPartridge, O'Connell & Whitney and
tion is one within the express terms of
"Vallace O'Connell, San Francisco, for resubdivision 3 of section 340 of the Code
spondent.
of Civil Procedure. That section is a
special statute controlling the time within
SPENCE, Justice.
which any action covering such injury 'may
Plaintiff is the compensation insurance be commenced, and it prevails over the gericarrier for an employer whose employee eral statute applicable to actions based upon
sustained an industrial inj ury allegedly a "liability created by statute". Code eiv.
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Proe. sec. 338, subd. 1. In line with this
principle, the one-year statute has been
held applicable to all actioll for personal
injuries based upon the liahility of the owner of an automobile for imputed negiigcnce
of the driver thereof under section 402 of
the Vehicle Code. Franceschi v. Scott, 7
Cal.App.2d 494, 495-496, 46 P.2d 764, and
to an actioll: for personal iuj uries hased upon the liability of the driver's parents who
had signed and verified the driver's application for an operator's license as required
by section 352 of the Vehicle Code. McFarland v. Cordiero, 99 Ca1.App. 352, 354355, 278 P. 889. Certainly if such prin.ciple applies in cases where a new person,
by virtue of statutory authority, may be
sued on a persona1 injury claim, see Ridley
v. Young, 64 ·CaI.App.2d 503, 509, 149 P.2d
76, it should apply here where. a new person, under statutory authority, may sue on
a personal injury claim. There is nothing
in the Labor Code, sees. 3850-3863, which
would indicate an intention to impqse a'
greater 'burden on the tort-feasor if recovery
ori the employee's damage claim is sought by
the employer or its insurance carrier rather
than the injured employee insofar as the
time of suit is concerned. The tort liability
to respond in general damages on the personal injury claim remains the same. To
hold otherwise would produce'the anomalous
result whereby the employee's tort action
would be barred if he. undertook to prosecute it and yet the employer or its insurance
carrier could recover damages at a later
date for the employee on that same cause
of action. Accordingly, plaintiff unavailingly argues that its IIfourth cause of action" is gov~rned by the gen:eral threeyear statute -of limitations applicahle to a
"liability created by statute", Code Civ.
Proc. § 338, subd. 1.
[2,3] During the pendency of the appeal it was suggested that the judgment of
dismissal of the fourth cause of action
was not a final judgment, and was therefore not appealable. Code Civ.Proc. § 963.
Counsel were then askcd to stipulate regarding the status of the record. According to their stipulation, the complaint was
filed with one plaintiff and two defendants
and embodied four causes of action: the
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first is against the Pacific Gas and Electric Company to recover on plaintiff's own
behalf the sum of $1,684.12, beiug the allcged amount of compensation benefits paid
by it to the injured employee; the second
is against the Pacific Gas and Electric
Company to recover as statutory trustee for
the injured employee, Labor Code, § 3854,
the sum of $50,000, being the alleg-cd general damages suffered by the injurcd empIoyee; the third is similar to the first
but against Bechtel Corporation to recover
on plaintiff's own behalf the same alleged
amount of compensation "benefits paid by it
to the injured employee; and the fourth is
s-imilar to the second but against Bechtel
Corporation to recover as statutory trustee
for the injured employee the same alleged
general damages suffered by him. Defendant Pacific Gas and Electric Company has
never appeared in the action.
The nonappearance of defendant Pacific
Gas and Electric Company in this action
does not preclude the judgment with respect to the other appearing defendant
from being a final appealable judgment.
Rocca v. Steinmetz, 189 Cal. 426, 428, 208
P. %4; Howe v. Key System Transit Co.,
198 Cal. 525, 529, 246 P. 39; Young v.
Superior Court, 16 Cal.2d 211, 215, 105 P.2d
363; Weisz v. McKee, 31 Cal.App.2d 144,
147, 87 P.2d 379, 88 P.2d 200. While there
appears to 'he no authority on the effect of
the admitted nonadjudication of the third
cause of action in relation to the finality of
the judgment entered on the fourth cause
of action in favor of the same defendant,
Bechtel Corporation, practical considerations and legal principles sustain the propriety -of treating these two causes of action
as separate matters for litigation in the
discretion of the court. See Code Civ.
Proc. § 579.
The judgment on the fourth cause of action was a final determination of the rights
of plaintiff as statutory trustee seeking to
recover general damages for the benefit of
the injured employee. As a final determination of the rights of plaintiff in that capacity, such judgment should be regarded
as having the same measure of ,finality as
would a similar judgment in an action
in which there were two plaintiffs seeking

8
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their respective damages from .the same defendant on two severable causes of action:
(1) the insurance carrier f0r recovety of"
its own compensation expenditures;, and
(2) the injured employee for recovery of'
his own general damages. Such cases as
Mather v. Mather, 5 Cal.2d 617, 55 P.2d
1174, and Greenfield v. Mather, 14 Ca1.2d
228, 93 P.2d 100, involve an entirely different situation in that there each of the
suc;cessive judgments left undetermined between the same parties in their same individual capacities another alleged cause or
causes of action for the same identical relief. Under the circumstances here, we
conclude that the judgment of dismissal of
the fourth cause of action is a ,final judgment within the meaning of section %3 of
the Code of Civil Procedure and is :therefore appealable.
The judgment is affirmed.

third and cla:ims damages to Cabella of
$50,000.
Apparently defendant Pacific Gas and
Electric 'Co. did not demur. At any rate,
that is not here important. The third ~md
fourth causes of action were for defendant
Bechtel's rtegligen'ce in injuring Cabella, the
employee, the 'third' asking as damages only

the amount paid by plaintiff to Cabella for
workmen's compensation and the fourth
for additional damages suffered by Cabella.
The demurrer was sustained as to the
fourth 'cause only and the judgment entered
dismissed that cause of action only. T'he
appeal 'was taken from that judgment.
That judgment is not appealable for 'tll"ere
can, .be hut one judgme,nt in an aCtion.

After trial on the third- cause of action is
had,' another judgment would be entered.
That 'is"to say, there cannot ~e separate
ju'dgments' on d~ffe'rent causes' of action
whe're the same parties are involved. The
GIBSON, C. J., and EDMONDS and, Judgment' dismissing the fourth cause of
SCHAUER, JJ., concur.
a'ttion is interlocutory and hence not' appealable. 'Mather v. Mather,S Cal.2d 617,
CARTER; Justice.
55 P.2d 1174; Bank of America Nat. Trust
I dissent.
& Savirigs,-i\.'s's:n v. Superior C()urt, 20 Cal.
The appeal in this case should be dis- 2d 697; 128 P.2d 357; Greenfield v. Mather,
missed as there is no final judgment, but 14 Ca1.2d 228, 93 P.2d 100; Sjoberg v,
if the case is to be decided on jtsmerits, Hastorf, 33 Cal.2d 116,199 P.2d 668. The
the 3-year statute of limitation foraliabili- rule, is stated in Bank ,of America v. Su:.
ty created by statute is applicable, arid the: perior Court, supra, 20 Cal.2d 697, 701, 128
judgment should be reversed. Code Civ. P.2d', 357, 360: "They assume that there
Proc., § 338(1).
cal1 'be a piecemeal disposition of tb.e
01]. the question of-appeal; it appears,tha:t- seve~al counts of a complaint.' , They asthere' is yet no final judgment in:the action surn~, when there 'is ~~'re tha~ 'one count
from which an appeal 'may be taken. The iri a' coinplaint~ and a' deniu~rer is i'nterrecord shows_ that the complaint on file posed and sustained, and a "judgment of ,dis:' '
purported' to state four causes 6f action. missal en.tered, that ther:e are: as many sepaThe, first asserts negligence on the part rate judgments as there ate' ,c'6unts in the,
of one defendant; Pacific Gas ,and Electric complaint. That is no't the law. There"
Co., ;resulting in injury to Cabella, an em'" cantlot 'be 'a separat:e judgment 'as to one
ployee of plaintiff's insured, in the course' count in a complaint ~oi1taining "several
of his] employment and .. the payment,'of counts. O:n. the contrary" there can he but
workmen's compensation to him. The" one jUclgment in an, -action no matter how
second- ·re-alleges· ,th,e allegations' of ,the manY"counts the complaint, contains. De
first and claims ,Cabella Was damaged by Val1y ,v. Kendall De Vally O. Co., Ltd.,
the injury in the svm, of $50,000 .. In the 220 ,Cal. 742, 32 P.2d 638; Mather v.
third, the allegations of the first are, again Mather,S Cal.2d 617, 55 P.2d 1174; Potvin
adopted and it alleges another defendant, , v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc."130 Cal.
Bechtel, was also negligent, and claim is App. 510, 20 P.2d 129. In the De Vally'
ma(le' for payments made .for workmen's case,:'supra, a demurrer ,was, sustained and,;
compens,ation. '; The "fourth, 're-alleges the, a· judgment entered dismissing tWo counts
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of a four-count complaint. The court
held that the judgment was premature, and
dismissed the appeal from it, and stated
(220 Cal. at page 745, 32 P.2d at page 639):
'Although the matter is not mentioned by
counsel for either side, it appears that the
court should not have given a judgment
herein until the final disposition of the entire cause. The law contemplates but one
final judgment in a cause. As stated in
the case of Nolan v. Smith, 137 Cal. 360,
361,70 P. 166, quoting from Stockton Combined Harvester & Agricultural Works v.
Glen Falls Ins. Co., 98 Cal. (557) 577, 33
P. 633: "There can be but one final jl1dgment in an action, and that is one which,
in effect, ends the suit in the court in which
it was entered, and finally determines the
rights of the parties in relation to the matter in controversy.'"
This language was
approved in the Potvin case, supra, where
the court said (130 Ca1.App. at page 512.
20 P.2d at page 130): 4Since a final judgment in an action contemplates a complcte
adjudication of the rights of the parties
and a final determination of the matter in
controversy. it is apparent that the so~called
judgment rendered upon the sustaining of
a demurrer to one cause of action of a complaint without leave to amend, leaving five
other- causes of action unimpaired presenting matters to be litigated during a trial
of the issues of fact, cannot be regarded as
a final determination and disposal of thc
cause.' "
The majority seeks to escape this rule
by stating that because plaintiff was suing
in one capacity in the third count of the
complaint, that is, in his own right, and in
the fourth count, as trustee for his injured
employee, the' judgment entered on the
fourth 'count is a final judgment. That is
to say, there could be two final judgments
in'the case, one on the third count 'and the
other on· the fourth count. The reason
given is that it would be like a case where
two plaintiffs, eaeh seeking damages from
the same defendant on f~severable" causes
of action, onc being by the insurance carrier for its compensation expenditures and
the other by the employee for his personal
injuries.
264 P.2d-l%
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The reasoning is faulty. The basic notion of one single judgment as stated in all
the cases hereinabove cited is that all the
factual issues should be settled in one judgment, unless on a collateral matter one of
several parties presents issues which are
finally adjudicated as to him. In the instant case there are not two' parties plaintiff in any true sense because the recovery
by plaintiff on either cause of action rests
upon identical issues: Was the defendant
negligent? Was plaintiff's injured employee contributively negligent? If defendant was negligent and plaintiff's employee not, how much damages has the
latter suffered? Plaintiff as employer is
not entitled to recover any amount on his
own behalf unless he is entitled to recover
on behalf of his employee, and if he is entitled to recover on behalf of the latter, the
right of the employer to recover what he
has paid in compensation and medical expenses follows as a matter of coursej there
is really no issue on the right to recover
those two items of damage. Hence there
cannot be any finality to a judgment as to
the employer and not as to the employee or
vice versa, whether either or both or one
or the other is suing. Thus, this is not
in fact a severable action to the extent at
least that two judgments arc required or
proper.
The law authorizes these causes of action to be joined, and it is at least doubtful
that they could be brought separately.
Certainly, if they were -brought .separately,
a judgment on one as to liability would be
res judicata as to the other. Suppose the
statute of limitation had not run, could
plaintiff now bring another action on behalf
of the employee? It seems obvious to me
that it could not. Then how can separate
judgments be rendered in this action if only
one action could be brought?
With reference to the statute of limita:.
tion, the majority holds that inasmuch as a
personal injury is involved the I-year
statute, Code Civ.Proc. § 340(3), applies
rather than the 3~year period for a statu:.
tory liability. That conclusion is reached
by construing the provision relating to an
injury to a person as being special or

---
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particular, whereas the one deating with
. statutory liability is general and the particular controls over, the general., The effect
'of this holding is that every action 'or· pro·ceeding mentioned in the limitation statutes
prevails over the statutory liability provision regardless of whether the liability is
or is not created by statute. This is true
because all of them would be particular,
like an injury to a person, and thus controlling over the ,statutory liability 5ec~ion.
The result is to give to the statutory liability section no more effect than. if it were
an omnibus or catch~all provision. That it
was not intended as such is plain. The
Legislature has exptcssly enacted such a
:statute. Code Civ.Proc. § 343. The statu4
:tory liability section -is read out of the books
as the test is no longer whether or not the
liability is created by statute, as all the
previous authorities supposed, it is whether
there is some other provision fitting the
case.

Guaranty & Surety Co., 39 Cal.App. 422,
179 P. 222.
Here it is clear that in the absence' 0'£
statute the employer would have no cause
of action for injuries suffered by his' em'4
pIoyee, hence, the liability, if any, is created
by statute, and the 3-year statute of limita:..
tion applies.
SHENK, J., concurs.
TRAYNOR, Justice.
I dissent.
I agree with Mr. Justice CARTER that
the appeal should be dismissed for the reasons set forth in his opinion.

o

i, ~,,"'""'"":::"",,",,:;,,"''"''
41 Cal.2d 729
v.

O'HEARN 01 al.'

There is no basis for the assumption that
the personal injury section is particular
and the statutory liability general. On the
contrary', there are undoubtedly more of
the former than of the latter.

BERGER

The cases demonstrate that the test of
whether a liability is_ created by statute
and thus controlled by the limitation statute,
is whether, except for the statute there
would not be liability; the test is not that
stated by the majority. In Barber v. Mul4
ford, 117 Cal. 356, 49 P. 206, it Was held
that a mandamus proceeding to compel the
payment of a claim against a county based
on contract was a statutory liability be~
cause it was the county's duty -by statute
to p'ay it. Recovey,Y of commissions by the
district attorney on moneys collected by
him' from the county is governed by the 3~
year statute, not the 2-year period for lia4
bilities not founded on a written instru4
rnent. Higby v. Calaveras County, 18 Cal.
176. An action on the official bond of an
officer is controlled by the 3-year statutory
liability provision although the bond is a
contract. County of Sonoma v. Hall, 132
Cal. 589, 62 P. 257, 312, 65 P. 12, 459;
Norton v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co.,
176 Cal. 212, 168 P. 16; Hellwig v. Title

Rehearing Denied .Tan. 11, 1954.
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Supreme Court of California.
In Banlc.
Dec. 15, H}:53.

Action against administrator of an eS4
tate to recover an indebtedness allegedly
due from decedent. The Superior Court,
San 1y1ateo County, Murray Draper, J., ,sustained defendant's demurrer without leave
to am~nd, and plaintiff appealed. The SU4
preme Court, Edmonds, J., held that provision of Code 0.£ Civil Procedure that if per4
son against whom action may be brought
dies before expiration of time liniited for
commencement thereof, and cause of action
survives, an action may be commenced
against his representatives, after expiration
of that time, and within one year after issu4
ing of letters testamentary or of admi'nistration, gives a claimant a period of grace
of one year from the issuance of letters in
any case in which general statute of limita4
tions would have expired before end of such
period, ,but such provision is applicable only
when necessary to extend a general statute
of limitations and cannot be used to curtail
it, and could not serve as basis of claim

